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Extract the logic for TrustedLen to a named method that can be called directly

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This commit is contained in:
Scott McMurray 2022-11-24 03:12:05 -08:00
parent 341d8b8a2c
commit 1c966e7f15
2 changed files with 37 additions and 32 deletions
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35
library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs
View File

@ -2870,6 +2870,41 @@ impl<T, A: Allocator> Vec<T, A> {
}
}
// specific extend for `TrustedLen` iterators, called both by the specializations
// and internal places where resolving specialization makes compilation slower
#[cfg(not(no_global_oom_handling))]
fn extend_trusted(&mut self, iterator: impl iter::TrustedLen<Item = T>) {
let (low, high) = iterator.size_hint();
if let Some(additional) = high {
debug_assert_eq!(
low,
additional,
"TrustedLen iterator's size hint is not exact: {:?}",
(low, high)
);
self.reserve(additional);
unsafe {
let mut ptr = self.as_mut_ptr().add(self.len());
let mut local_len = SetLenOnDrop::new(&mut self.len);
iterator.for_each(move |element| {
ptr::write(ptr, element);
ptr = ptr.add(1);
// Since the loop executes user code which can panic we have to bump the pointer
// after each step.
// NB can't overflow since we would have had to alloc the address space
local_len.increment_len(1);
});
}
} else {
// Per TrustedLen contract a `None` upper bound means that the iterator length
// truly exceeds usize::MAX, which would eventually lead to a capacity overflow anyway.
// Since the other branch already panics eagerly (via `reserve()`) we do the same here.
// This avoids additional codegen for a fallback code path which would eventually
// panic anyway.
panic!("capacity overflow");
}
}
/// Creates a splicing iterator that replaces the specified range in the vector
/// with the given `replace_with` iterator and yields the removed items.
/// `replace_with` does not need to be the same length as `range`.

34
library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs
View File

@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
use crate::alloc::Allocator;
use core::iter::TrustedLen;
use core::ptr::{self};
use core::slice::{self};
use super::{IntoIter, SetLenOnDrop, Vec};
use super::{IntoIter, Vec};
// Specialization trait used for Vec::extend
pub(super) trait SpecExtend<T, I> {
@ -24,36 +23,7 @@ where
I: TrustedLen<Item = T>,
{
default fn spec_extend(&mut self, iterator: I) {
// This is the case for a TrustedLen iterator.
let (low, high) = iterator.size_hint();
if let Some(additional) = high {
debug_assert_eq!(
low,
additional,
"TrustedLen iterator's size hint is not exact: {:?}",
(low, high)
);
self.reserve(additional);
unsafe {
let mut ptr = self.as_mut_ptr().add(self.len());
let mut local_len = SetLenOnDrop::new(&mut self.len);
iterator.for_each(move |element| {
ptr::write(ptr, element);
ptr = ptr.add(1);
// Since the loop executes user code which can panic we have to bump the pointer
// after each step.
// NB can't overflow since we would have had to alloc the address space
local_len.increment_len(1);
});
}
} else {
// Per TrustedLen contract a `None` upper bound means that the iterator length
// truly exceeds usize::MAX, which would eventually lead to a capacity overflow anyway.
// Since the other branch already panics eagerly (via `reserve()`) we do the same here.
// This avoids additional codegen for a fallback code path which would eventually
// panic anyway.
panic!("capacity overflow");
}
self.extend_trusted(iterator)
}
}