From 1c966e7f15a46cc015e7acfde4650b45fee55168 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Scott McMurray <scottmcm@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 03:12:05 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Extract the logic for `TrustedLen` to a named method that can
 be called directly

---
 library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs         | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs | 34 ++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs b/library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs
index 766006939fa..9da728b34c3 100644
--- a/library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs
+++ b/library/alloc/src/vec/mod.rs
@@ -2870,6 +2870,41 @@ impl<T, A: Allocator> Vec<T, A> {
         }
     }
 
+    // specific extend for `TrustedLen` iterators, called both by the specializations
+    // and internal places where resolving specialization makes compilation slower
+    #[cfg(not(no_global_oom_handling))]
+    fn extend_trusted(&mut self, iterator: impl iter::TrustedLen<Item = T>) {
+        let (low, high) = iterator.size_hint();
+        if let Some(additional) = high {
+            debug_assert_eq!(
+                low,
+                additional,
+                "TrustedLen iterator's size hint is not exact: {:?}",
+                (low, high)
+            );
+            self.reserve(additional);
+            unsafe {
+                let mut ptr = self.as_mut_ptr().add(self.len());
+                let mut local_len = SetLenOnDrop::new(&mut self.len);
+                iterator.for_each(move |element| {
+                    ptr::write(ptr, element);
+                    ptr = ptr.add(1);
+                    // Since the loop executes user code which can panic we have to bump the pointer
+                    // after each step.
+                    // NB can't overflow since we would have had to alloc the address space
+                    local_len.increment_len(1);
+                });
+            }
+        } else {
+            // Per TrustedLen contract a `None` upper bound means that the iterator length
+            // truly exceeds usize::MAX, which would eventually lead to a capacity overflow anyway.
+            // Since the other branch already panics eagerly (via `reserve()`) we do the same here.
+            // This avoids additional codegen for a fallback code path which would eventually
+            // panic anyway.
+            panic!("capacity overflow");
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Creates a splicing iterator that replaces the specified range in the vector
     /// with the given `replace_with` iterator and yields the removed items.
     /// `replace_with` does not need to be the same length as `range`.
diff --git a/library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs b/library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs
index 1ea9c827afd..56065ce565b 100644
--- a/library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs
+++ b/library/alloc/src/vec/spec_extend.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 use crate::alloc::Allocator;
 use core::iter::TrustedLen;
-use core::ptr::{self};
 use core::slice::{self};
 
-use super::{IntoIter, SetLenOnDrop, Vec};
+use super::{IntoIter, Vec};
 
 // Specialization trait used for Vec::extend
 pub(super) trait SpecExtend<T, I> {
@@ -24,36 +23,7 @@ where
     I: TrustedLen<Item = T>,
 {
     default fn spec_extend(&mut self, iterator: I) {
-        // This is the case for a TrustedLen iterator.
-        let (low, high) = iterator.size_hint();
-        if let Some(additional) = high {
-            debug_assert_eq!(
-                low,
-                additional,
-                "TrustedLen iterator's size hint is not exact: {:?}",
-                (low, high)
-            );
-            self.reserve(additional);
-            unsafe {
-                let mut ptr = self.as_mut_ptr().add(self.len());
-                let mut local_len = SetLenOnDrop::new(&mut self.len);
-                iterator.for_each(move |element| {
-                    ptr::write(ptr, element);
-                    ptr = ptr.add(1);
-                    // Since the loop executes user code which can panic we have to bump the pointer
-                    // after each step.
-                    // NB can't overflow since we would have had to alloc the address space
-                    local_len.increment_len(1);
-                });
-            }
-        } else {
-            // Per TrustedLen contract a `None` upper bound means that the iterator length
-            // truly exceeds usize::MAX, which would eventually lead to a capacity overflow anyway.
-            // Since the other branch already panics eagerly (via `reserve()`) we do the same here.
-            // This avoids additional codegen for a fallback code path which would eventually
-            // panic anyway.
-            panic!("capacity overflow");
-        }
+        self.extend_trusted(iterator)
     }
 }