We are piping curl downloads into `unpackTarfileToSink()`, but the
latter is typically slower than the former if you're on a fast
connection. So the download could appear unnecessarily slow. (There is
even a risk that if the Git import is *really* slow for whatever
reason, the TCP connection could time out.)
So let's make the download buffer bigger by default - 64 MiB is big
enough for the Nixpkgs tarball. Perhaps in the future, we could have
an unlimited buffer that spills data to disk beyond a certain
threshold, but that's probably overkill.
(cherry picked from commit 8ffea0a018)
The recent fix for CVE-2024-38531 broke the sandbox on macOS
completely. As it’s not practical to use `chroot(2)` on
macOS, the build takes place in the main filesystem tree, and the
world‐unreadable wrapper directory prevents the build from accessing
its `$TMPDIR` at all.
The macOS sandbox probably shouldn’t be treated as any kind of a
security boundary in its current state, but this specific vulnerability
wasn’t possible to exploit on macOS anyway, as creating `set{u,g}id`
binaries is blocked by sandbox policy.
Locking down the build sandbox further may be a good idea in future,
but it already has significant compatibility issues. For now, restore
the previous status quo on macOS.
Thanks to @alois31 for helping me come to a better understanding of
the vulnerability.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fbCloses: #11002
(cherry picked from commit af2e1142b1)
After the fix for CVE-2024-38531, this was only removing the nested
build directory, rather than the top‐level temporary directory.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fb
(cherry picked from commit 76e4adfaac)
Previously, the .chroot directory had permission 750 or 755 (depending
on the uid-range system feature) and was owned by root/nixbld. This
makes it possible for any nixbld user (if uid-range is disabled) or
any user (if uid-range is enabled) to inspect the contents of the
chroot of an active build and maybe interfere with it (e.g. via /tmp
in the chroot, which has 1777 permission).
To prevent this, the root is now a subdirectory of .chroot, which has
permission 700 and is owned by root/root.
(cherry picked from commit ede95b1fc1)
Instead of running the builds under
`$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-build-user}`, run them
under `$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-daemon}/{subdir-owned-by-the-build-user}`
where the build directory is only readable and traversable by the daemon user.
This achieves two things:
1. It prevents builders from making their build directory world-readable
(or even writeable), which would allow the outside world to interact
with them.
2. It prevents external processes running as the build user (either
because that somehow leaked, maybe as a consequence of 1., or because
`build-users` isn't in use) from gaining access to the build
directory.
(cherry picked from commit 1d3696f0fb)
Previously, the "file:./" prefix was not correctly recognized in
fixGitURL; instead, it was mistaken as a file path, which resulted in a
parsed url of the form "file://file:./".
This commit fixes the issue by properly detecting the "file:" prefix.
Note, however, that unlike "file://", the "file:./" URI is _not_
standardized, but has been widely used to referred to relative file
paths. In particular, the "git+file:./" did work for nix<=2.18, and was
broken since nix 2.19.0.
Finally, this commit fixes the issue completely for the 2.19 series, but
is still inadequate for the 2.20 series due to new behaviors from the
switch to libgit2. However, it does improve the correctness of parsing
even though it is not yet a complete solution.
(cherry picked from commit 8594f3cd5a)
fix old anchor redirects to point to the correct location
(cherry picked from commit 45697ba502)
Co-authored-by: Valentin Gagarin <valentin.gagarin@tweag.io>
In streaming mode, libarchive doesn't handle symlinks in zip files
correctly. So write the entire file to disk so libarchive can access
it in random-access mode.
Fixes#10649. This was broken in cabee98152.
(cherry picked from commit 9951e14ae0)
Passing the commit message as an argument causes update failures on repositories with lots of flake inputs. In some cases, the commit message is over 250,000 bytes.
(cherry picked from commit 8b5e8f4fba)
Closes#10585
As it turns out, libseccomp maintains an internal syscall table and
validates each rule against it. This means that when using libseccomp
2.5.4 or older, one may pass `452` as syscall number against it, but
since it doesn't exist in the internal structure, `libseccomp` will refuse
to create a filter for that. This happens with nixpkgs-23.11, i.e. on
stable NixOS and when building Nix against the project's flake.
To work around that
* a backport of libseccomp 2.5.5 on upstream nixpkgs has been
scheduled[1].
* the package now uses libseccomp 2.5.5 on its own already. This is to
provide a quick fix since the correct fix for 23.11 is still a staging cycle
away.
It must not be possible to build a Nix with an incompatible libseccomp
version (nothing can be built in a sandbox on Linux!), so configure.ac
rejects libseccomp if `__SNR_fchmodat2` is not defined.
We still need the compat header though since `SCMP_SYS(fchmodat2)`
internally transforms this into `__SNR_fchmodat2` which points to
`__NR_fchmodat2` from glibc 2.39, so it wouldn't build on glibc 2.38.
The updated syscall table from libseccomp 2.5.5 is NOT used for that
step, but used later, so we need both, our compat header and their
syscall table 🤷
[1] https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/306070
