The recent fix for CVE-2024-38531 broke the sandbox on macOS
completely. As it’s not practical to use `chroot(2)` on
macOS, the build takes place in the main filesystem tree, and the
world‐unreadable wrapper directory prevents the build from accessing
its `$TMPDIR` at all.
The macOS sandbox probably shouldn’t be treated as any kind of a
security boundary in its current state, but this specific vulnerability
wasn’t possible to exploit on macOS anyway, as creating `set{u,g}id`
binaries is blocked by sandbox policy.
Locking down the build sandbox further may be a good idea in future,
but it already has significant compatibility issues. For now, restore
the previous status quo on macOS.
Thanks to @alois31 for helping me come to a better understanding of
the vulnerability.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fbCloses: #11002
(cherry picked from commit af2e1142b1)
(cherry picked from commit 9feee13952)
After the fix for CVE-2024-38531, this was only removing the nested
build directory, rather than the top‐level temporary directory.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fb
(cherry picked from commit 76e4adfaac)
(cherry picked from commit 0d68b40dda)
When sandboxing is disabled, we cannot put $TMPDIR underneath an
inaccessible directory.
(cherry picked from commit 86ca2d6d94c0581fda0c666c5e022784952f3542)
(cherry picked from commit 8f58b98770)
Previously, the .chroot directory had permission 750 or 755 (depending
on the uid-range system feature) and was owned by root/nixbld. This
makes it possible for any nixbld user (if uid-range is disabled) or
any user (if uid-range is enabled) to inspect the contents of the
chroot of an active build and maybe interfere with it (e.g. via /tmp
in the chroot, which has 1777 permission).
To prevent this, the root is now a subdirectory of .chroot, which has
permission 700 and is owned by root/root.
(cherry picked from commit af280e72fa0e62e1c2eaccfb992c0dbb6f27f895)
Fixes an instance of
nix: src/libutil/util.cc:139: nix::Path nix::canonPath(PathView, bool): Assertion `path != ""' failed.
... which I've been getting in one of my shells for some reason.
I have yet to find out why TMPDIR was empty, but it's no reason for
Nix to break.
(cherry picked from commit c3fb2aa1f9)
Closes#10585
As it turns out, libseccomp maintains an internal syscall table and
validates each rule against it. This means that when using libseccomp
2.5.4 or older, one may pass `452` as syscall number against it, but
since it doesn't exist in the internal structure, `libseccomp` will refuse
to create a filter for that. This happens with nixpkgs-23.11, i.e. on
stable NixOS and when building Nix against the project's flake.
To work around that
* a backport of libseccomp 2.5.5 on upstream nixpkgs has been
scheduled[1].
* the package now uses libseccomp 2.5.5 on its own already. This is to
provide a quick fix since the correct fix for 23.11 is still a staging cycle
away.
It must not be possible to build a Nix with an incompatible libseccomp
version (nothing can be built in a sandbox on Linux!), so configure.ac
rejects libseccomp if `__SNR_fchmodat2` is not defined.
We still need the compat header though since `SCMP_SYS(fchmodat2)`
internally transforms this into `__SNR_fchmodat2` which points to
`__NR_fchmodat2` from glibc 2.39, so it wouldn't build on glibc 2.38.
The updated syscall table from libseccomp 2.5.5 is NOT used for that
step, but used later, so we need both, our compat header and their
syscall table 🤷
[1] https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/306070
(cherry picked from commit 73918b0ae4)
With Linux kernel >=6.6 & glibc 2.39 a `fchmodat2(2)` is available that
isn't filtered away by the libseccomp sandbox.
Being able to use this to bypass that restriction has surprising results
for some builds such as lxc[1]:
> With kernel ≥6.6 and glibc 2.39, lxc's install phase uses fchmodat2,
> which slips through 9b88e52846/src/libstore/build/local-derivation-goal.cc (L1650-L1663).
> The fixupPhase then uses fchmodat, which fails.
> With older kernel or glibc, setting the suid bit fails in the
> install phase, which is not treated as fatal, and then the
> fixup phase does not try to set it again.
Please note that there are still ways to bypass this sandbox[2] and this is
mostly a fix for the breaking builds.
This change works by creating a syscall filter for the `fchmodat2`
syscall (number 452 on most systems). The problem is that glibc 2.39
and seccomp 2.5.5 are needed to have the correct syscall number available
via `__NR_fchmodat2` / `__SNR_fchmodat2`, but this flake is still on
nixpkgs 23.11. To have this change everywhere and not dependent on the
glibc this package is built against, I added a header
"fchmodat2-compat.hh" that sets the syscall number based on the
architecture. On most platforms its 452 according to glibc with a few
exceptions:
$ rg --pcre2 'define __NR_fchmodat2 (?!452)'
sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/x32/arch-syscall.h
58:#define __NR_fchmodat2 1073742276
sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/mips64/n32/arch-syscall.h
67:#define __NR_fchmodat2 6452
sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/mips64/n64/arch-syscall.h
62:#define __NR_fchmodat2 5452
sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/mips32/arch-syscall.h
70:#define __NR_fchmodat2 4452
sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/alpha/arch-syscall.h
59:#define __NR_fchmodat2 562
I tested the change by adding the diff below as patch to
`pkgs/tools/package-management/nix/common.nix` & then built a VM from
the following config using my dirty nixpkgs master:
{
vm = { pkgs, ... }: {
virtualisation.writableStore = true;
virtualisation.memorySize = 8192;
virtualisation.diskSize = 12 * 1024;
nix.package = pkgs.nixVersions.nix_2_21;
};
}
The original issue can be triggered via
nix build -L github:nixos/nixpkgs/d6dc19adbda4fd92fe9a332327a8113eaa843894#lxc \
--extra-experimental-features 'nix-command flakes'
however the problem disappears with this patch applied.
Closes#10424
[1] https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/300635#issuecomment-2031073804
[2] https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/300635#issuecomment-2030844251
(cherry picked from commit ba68045187)
Instead of running the builds under
`$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-build-user}`, run them
under `$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-daemon}/{subdir-owned-by-the-build-user}`
where the build directory is only readable and traversable by the daemon user.
This achieves two things:
1. It prevents builders from making their build directory world-readable
(or even writeable), which would allow the outside world to interact
with them.
2. It prevents external processes running as the build user (either
because that somehow leaked, maybe as a consequence of 1., or because
`build-users` isn't in use) from gaining access to the build
directory.
fix: do not use unknown setting
tests: remove build-dir test
the location of files is hard-coded by mdBook.
there is also seems to be no way to define custom templates, therefore
all styling has to be done in the CSS override.
Co-authored-by: Robert Hensing <roberth@users.noreply.github.com>
As discussed in the maintainer meeting on 2024-01-29.
Mainly this is to avoid a situation where the name is parsed and
treated as a file name, mostly to protect users.
.-* and ..-* are also considered invalid because they might strip
on that separator to remove versions. Doesn't really work, but that's
what we decided, and I won't argue with it, because .-* probably
doesn't seem to have a real world application anyway.
We do still permit a 1-character name that's just "-", which still
poses a similar risk in such a situation. We can't start disallowing
trailing -, because a non-zero number of users will need it and we've
seen how annoying and painful such a change is.
What matters most is preventing a situation where . or .. can be
injected, and to just get this done.
It is possible to exfiltrate a file descriptor out of the build sandbox
of FODs, and use it to modify the store path after it has been
registered.
To avoid that issue, don't register the output of the build, but a copy
of it (that will be free of any leaked file descriptor).
Co-authored-by: Theophane Hufschmitt <theophane.hufschmitt@tweag.io>
Co-authored-by: Valentin Gagarin <valentin.gagarin@tweag.io>
Test that we can't leverage abstract unix domain sockets to leak file
descriptors out of the sandbox and modify the path after it has been
registered.
Co-authored-by: Theophane Hufschmitt <theophane.hufschmitt@tweag.io>
This PR reduces the creation of short-lived basic_json objects while
parsing flake.lock files. For large flake.lock files (~1.5MB) I was
observing ~60s being spent for trivial nix build operations while
after this change it is now taking ~1.6s.
(cherry picked from commit 7fd0de38c6)
