Link with default MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET if not otherwise specified.
This PR sets the MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET environment variable during the linking stage to our default, if it is not specified. This way it matches the deployment target we pass to llvm. If not set the the linker uses Xcode or Xcode commandline tools default which varies by version.
Fixes#90342, #91082.
Drive-by fixes to make Rust behave more like clang:
* Default to 11.0 deployment target for ARM64 which is the earliest version that had support for it.
* Set the llvm target to `arm64-apple-macosx<deployment target>` instead of `aarch64-apple-macosx<deployment target>`.
Restrict aarch64 outline atomics to glibc for now.
The introduced dependency on `getauxval` causes linking problems with musl, making compiling any binaries for `aarch64-unknown-linux-musl` impossible without workarounds such as using lld or adding liblibc.rlib again to the linker invocation, see #89626.
This is a workaround until libc>0.2.108 is merged.
LLVM has built-in heuristics for adding stack canaries to functions. These
heuristics can be selected with LLVM function attributes. This patch adds a
rustc option `-Z stack-protector={none,basic,strong,all}` which controls the use
of these attributes. This gives rustc the same stack smash protection support as
clang offers through options `-fno-stack-protector`, `-fstack-protector`,
`-fstack-protector-strong`, and `-fstack-protector-all`. The protection this can
offer is demonstrated in test/ui/abi/stack-protector.rs. This fills a gap in the
current list of rustc exploit
mitigations (https://doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/exploit-mitigations.html),
originally discussed in #15179.
Stack smash protection adds runtime overhead and is therefore still off by
default, but now users have the option to trade performance for security as they
see fit. An example use case is adding Rust code in an existing C/C++ code base
compiled with stack smash protection. Without the ability to add stack smash
protection to the Rust code, the code base artifacts could be exploitable in
ways not possible if the code base remained pure C/C++.
Stack smash protection support is present in LLVM for almost all the current
tier 1/tier 2 targets: see
test/assembly/stack-protector/stack-protector-target-support.rs. The one
exception is nvptx64-nvidia-cuda. This patch follows clang's example, and adds a
warning message printed if stack smash protection is used with this target (see
test/ui/stack-protector/warn-stack-protector-unsupported.rs). Support for tier 3
targets has not been checked.
Since the heuristics are applied at the LLVM level, the heuristics are expected
to add stack smash protection to a fraction of functions comparable to C/C++.
Some experiments demonstrating how Rust code is affected by the different
heuristics can be found in
test/assembly/stack-protector/stack-protector-heuristics-effect.rs. There is
potential for better heuristics using Rust-specific safety information. For
example it might be reasonable to skip stack smash protection in functions which
transitively only use safe Rust code, or which uses only a subset of functions
the user declares safe (such as anything under `std.*`). Such alternative
heuristics could be added at a later point.
LLVM also offers a "safestack" sanitizer as an alternative way to guard against
stack smashing (see #26612). This could possibly also be included as a
stack-protection heuristic. An alternative is to add it as a sanitizer (#39699).
This is what clang does: safestack is exposed with option
`-fsanitize=safe-stack`.
The options are only supported by the LLVM backend, but as with other codegen
options it is visible in the main codegen option help menu. The heuristic names
"basic", "strong", and "all" are hopefully sufficiently generic to be usable in
other backends as well.
Reviewed-by: Nikita Popov <nikic@php.net>
Extra commits during review:
- [address-review] make the stack-protector option unstable
- [address-review] reduce detail level of stack-protector option help text
- [address-review] correct grammar in comment
- [address-review] use compiler flag to avoid merging functions in test
- [address-review] specify min LLVM version in fortanix stack-protector test
Only for Fortanix test, since this target specifically requests the
`--x86-experimental-lvi-inline-asm-hardening` flag.
- [address-review] specify required LLVM components in stack-protector tests
- move stack protector option enum closer to other similar option enums
- rustc_interface/tests: sort debug option list in tracking hash test
- add an explicit `none` stack-protector option
Revert "set LLVM requirements for all stack protector support test revisions"
This reverts commit a49b74f92a4e7d701d6f6cf63d207a8aff2e0f68.
std: Get the standard library compiling for wasm64
This commit goes through and updates various `#[cfg]` as appropriate to
get the wasm64-unknown-unknown target behaving similarly to the
wasm32-unknown-unknown target. Most of this is just updating various
conditions for `target_arch = "wasm32"` to also account for `target_arch
= "wasm64"` where appropriate. This commit also lists `wasm64` as an
allow-listed architecture to not have the `restricted_std` feature
enabled, enabling experimentation with `-Z build-std` externally.
The main goal of this commit is to enable playing around with
`wasm64-unknown-unknown` externally via `-Z build-std` in a way that's
similar to the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target. These targets are
effectively the same and only differ in their pointer size, but wasm64
is much newer and has much less ecosystem/library support so it'll still
take time to get wasm64 fully-fledged.
* Add wasm64 variants for inline assembly along the same lines as wasm32
* Update a few directives in libtest to check for `target_family`
instead of `target_arch`
* Update some rustc codegen and typechecks specialized for wasm32 to
also work for wasm64.
This commit goes through and updates various `#[cfg]` as appropriate to
get the wasm64-unknown-unknown target behaving similarly to the
wasm32-unknown-unknown target. Most of this is just updating various
conditions for `target_arch = "wasm32"` to also account for `target_arch
= "wasm64"` where appropriate. This commit also lists `wasm64` as an
allow-listed architecture to not have the `restricted_std` feature
enabled, enabling experimentation with `-Z build-std` externally.
The main goal of this commit is to enable playing around with
`wasm64-unknown-unknown` externally via `-Z build-std` in a way that's
similar to the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target. These targets are
effectively the same and only differ in their pointer size, but wasm64
is much newer and has much less ecosystem/library support so it'll still
take time to get wasm64 fully-fledged.
After updating the minimum required LLVM version to 12 we can use
apple-a14 as that is closer in features to the Apple M1 than the A12.
Once the minimum required LLVM version is updated to 13 we can use
apple-m1.
Add new tier 3 target: `x86_64-unknown-none`
Adds support for compiling OS kernels or other bare-metal applications for the x86-64 architecture.
Below are details on how this target meets the requirements for tier 3:
> A tier 3 target must have a designated developer or developers (the "target maintainers") on record to be CCed when issues arise regarding the target. (The mechanism to track and CC such developers may evolve over time.)
I would be willing to be a target maintainer, though I would appreciate if others volunteered to help with that as well.
> Targets must use naming consistent with any existing targets; for instance, a target for the same CPU or OS as an existing Rust target should use the same name for that CPU or OS. Targets should normally use the same names and naming conventions as used elsewhere in the broader ecosystem beyond Rust (such as in other toolchains), unless they have a very good reason to diverge. Changing the name of a target can be highly disruptive, especially once the target reaches a higher tier, so getting the name right is important even for a tier 3 target.
Uses the same naming as the LLVM target, and the same convention as many other bare-metal targets.
> Target names should not introduce undue confusion or ambiguity unless absolutely necessary to maintain ecosystem compatibility. For example, if the name of the target makes people extremely likely to form incorrect beliefs about what it targets, the name should be changed or augmented to disambiguate it.
I don't believe there is any ambiguity here.
> Tier 3 targets may have unusual requirements to build or use, but must not create legal issues or impose onerous legal terms for the Rust project or for Rust developers or users.
I don't see any legal issues here.
> The target must not introduce license incompatibilities.
> Anything added to the Rust repository must be under the standard Rust license (MIT OR Apache-2.0).
> The target must not cause the Rust tools or libraries built for any other host (even when supporting cross-compilation to the target) to depend on any new dependency less permissive than the Rust licensing policy. This applies whether the dependency is a Rust crate that would require adding new license exceptions (as specified by the tidy tool in the rust-lang/rust repository), or whether the dependency is a native library or binary. In other words, the introduction of the target must not cause a user installing or running a version of Rust or the Rust tools to be subject to any new license requirements.
>If the target supports building host tools (such as rustc or cargo), those host tools must not depend on proprietary (non-FOSS) libraries, other than ordinary runtime libraries supplied by the platform and commonly used by other binaries built for the target. For instance, rustc built for the target may depend on a common proprietary C runtime library or console output library, but must not depend on a proprietary code generation library or code optimization library. Rust's license permits such combinations, but the Rust project has no interest in maintaining such combinations within the scope of Rust itself, even at tier 3.
> Targets should not require proprietary (non-FOSS) components to link a functional binary or library.
> "onerous" here is an intentionally subjective term. At a minimum, "onerous" legal/licensing terms include but are not limited to: non-disclosure requirements, non-compete requirements, contributor license agreements (CLAs) or equivalent, "non-commercial"/"research-only"/etc terms, requirements conditional on the employer or employment of any particular Rust developers, revocable terms, any requirements that create liability for the Rust project or its developers or users, or any requirements that adversely affect the livelihood or prospects of the Rust project or its developers or users.
I see no issues with any of the above.
> Neither this policy nor any decisions made regarding targets shall create any binding agreement or estoppel by any party. If any member of an approving Rust team serves as one of the maintainers of a target, or has any legal or employment requirement (explicit or implicit) that might affect their decisions regarding a target, they must recuse themselves from any approval decisions regarding the target's tier status, though they may otherwise participate in discussions.
> This requirement does not prevent part or all of this policy from being cited in an explicit contract or work agreement (e.g. to implement or maintain support for a target). This requirement exists to ensure that a developer or team responsible for reviewing and approving a target does not face any legal threats or obligations that would prevent them from freely exercising their judgment in such approval, even if such judgment involves subjective matters or goes beyond the letter of these requirements.
Only relevant to those making approval decisions.
> Tier 3 targets should attempt to implement as much of the standard libraries as possible and appropriate (core for most targets, alloc for targets that can support dynamic memory allocation, std for targets with an operating system or equivalent layer of system-provided functionality), but may leave some code unimplemented (either unavailable or stubbed out as appropriate), whether because the target makes it impossible to implement or challenging to implement. The authors of pull requests are not obligated to avoid calling any portions of the standard library on the basis of a tier 3 target not implementing those portions.
`core` and `alloc` can be used. `std` cannot be used as this is a bare-metal target.
> The target must provide documentation for the Rust community explaining how to build for the target, using cross-compilation if possible. If the target supports running tests (even if they do not pass), the documentation must explain how to run tests for the target, using emulation if possible or dedicated hardware if necessary.
Use `--target=x86_64-unknown-none-elf` option to cross compile, just like any target. The target does not support running tests.
> Tier 3 targets must not impose burden on the authors of pull requests, or other developers in the community, to maintain the target. In particular, do not post comments (automated or manual) on a PR that derail or suggest a block on the PR based on a tier 3 target. Do not send automated messages or notifications (via any medium, including via `@)` to a PR author or others involved with a PR regarding a tier 3 target, unless they have opted into such messages.
> Backlinks such as those generated by the issue/PR tracker when linking to an issue or PR are not considered a violation of this policy, within reason. However, such messages (even on a separate repository) must not generate notifications to anyone involved with a PR who has not requested such notifications.
I don't foresee this being a problem.
> Patches adding or updating tier 3 targets must not break any existing tier 2 or tier 1 target, and must not knowingly break another tier 3 target without approval of either the compiler team or the maintainers of the other tier 3 target.
> In particular, this may come up when working on closely related targets, such as variations of the same architecture with different features. Avoid introducing unconditional uses of features that another variation of the target may not have; use conditional compilation or runtime detection, as appropriate, to let each target run code supported by that target.
No other targets should be affected by the pull request.
For our kernel targets, we should not set OS, as the kernel runs bare
metal without a circular dependency on std.
This also prepares us for unifying with
https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/89062. This patch requires
libhermit-rs to change a `cfg`s from `target_os = "hermit"` to `target_os
= "none"`.
I tested this patch locally.
Add LLVM CFI support to the Rust compiler
This PR adds LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) support to the Rust compiler. It initially provides forward-edge control flow protection for Rust-compiled code only by aggregating function pointers in groups identified by their number of arguments.
Forward-edge control flow protection for C or C++ and Rust -compiled code "mixed binaries" (i.e., for when C or C++ and Rust -compiled code share the same virtual address space) will be provided in later work as part of this project by defining and using compatible type identifiers (see Type metadata in the design document in the tracking issue #89653).
LLVM CFI can be enabled with -Zsanitizer=cfi and requires LTO (i.e., -Clto).
Thank you, `@eddyb` and `@pcc,` for all the help!
This commit adds LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) support to the Rust
compiler. It initially provides forward-edge control flow protection for
Rust-compiled code only by aggregating function pointers in groups
identified by their number of arguments.
Forward-edge control flow protection for C or C++ and Rust -compiled
code "mixed binaries" (i.e., for when C or C++ and Rust -compiled code
share the same virtual address space) will be provided in later work as
part of this project by defining and using compatible type identifiers
(see Type metadata in the design document in the tracking issue #89653).
LLVM CFI can be enabled with -Zsanitizer=cfi and requires LTO (i.e.,
-Clto).
Fix wrong niche calculation when 2+ niches are placed at the start
When the niche is at the start, existing code incorrectly uses 1 instead of count for subtraction.
Fix#90038
`@rustbot` label: T-compiler
HermitCore's kernel itself doesn't support TLS.
Consequently, the entries in x86_64-unknown-none-hermitkernel should be removed.
This commit should help to finalize #89062.
Specify the `cpu` and the `max_atomic_width` (64).
Set `stack_probes` similarly to other targets to work around known
issues, and copy the corresponding comment from those targets.
Build position-independent code that doesn't require relocations.
(Work on this target sponsored by Profian.)
Most Rust freestanding/bare-metal targets use just `-unknown-none` here,
including aarch64-unknown-none, mipsel-unknown-none, and the BPF
targets. The *only* target using `-unknown-none-elf` is RISC-V.
The underlying toolchain doesn't care; LLVM accepts both `x86_64-unknown-none`
and `x86_64-unknown-none-elf`.
In addition, there's a long history of embedded x86 targets with varying
definitions for the `elf` suffix; on some of those embedded targets,
`elf` implied the inclusion of a C library based on newlib or similar.
Using `x86_64-unknown-none` avoids any potential ambiguity there.
(Work on this target sponsored by Profian.)
SOLID[1] is an embedded development platform provided by Kyoto
Microcomputer Co., Ltd. This commit introduces a basic Tier 3 support
for SOLID.
# New Targets
The following targets are added:
- `aarch64-kmc-solid_asp3`
- `armv7a-kmc-solid_asp3-eabi`
- `armv7a-kmc-solid_asp3-eabihf`
SOLID's target software system can be divided into two parts: an
RTOS kernel, which is responsible for threading and synchronization,
and Core Services, which provides filesystems, networking, and other
things. The RTOS kernel is a μITRON4.0[2][3]-derived kernel based on
the open-source TOPPERS RTOS kernels[4]. For uniprocessor systems
(more precisely, systems where only one processor core is allocated for
SOLID), this will be the TOPPERS/ASP3 kernel. As μITRON is
traditionally only specified at the source-code level, the ABI is
unique to each implementation, which is why `asp3` is included in the
target names.
More targets could be added later, as we support other base kernels
(there are at least three at the point of writing) and are interested
in supporting other processor architectures in the future.
# C Compiler
Although SOLID provides its own supported C/C++ build toolchain, GNU Arm
Embedded Toolchain seems to work for the purpose of building Rust.
# Unresolved Questions
A μITRON4 kernel can support `Thread::unpark` natively, but it's not
used by this commit's implementation because the underlying kernel
feature is also used to implement `Condvar`, and it's unclear whether
`std` should guarantee that parking tokens are not clobbered by other
synchronization primitives.
# Unsupported or Unimplemented Features
Most features are implemented. The following features are not
implemented due to the lack of native support:
- `fs::File::{file_attr, truncate, duplicate, set_permissions}`
- `fs::{symlink, link, canonicalize}`
- Process creation
- Command-line arguments
Backtrace generation is not really a good fit for embedded targets, so
it's intentionally left unimplemented. Unwinding is functional, however.
## Dynamic Linking
Dynamic linking is not supported. The target platform supports dynamic
linking, but enabling this in Rust causes several problems.
- The linker invocation used to build the shared object of `std` is
too long for the platform-provided linker to handle.
- A linker script with specific requirements is required for the
compiled shared object to be actually loadable.
As such, we decided to disable dynamic linking for now. Regardless, the
users can try to create shared objects by manually invoking the linker.
## Executable
Building an executable is not supported as the notion of "executable
files" isn't well-defined for these targets.
[1] https://solid.kmckk.com/SOLID/
[2] http://ertl.jp/ITRON/SPEC/mitron4-e.html
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITRON_project
[4] https://toppers.jp/
Add initial support for m68k
This patch series adds initial support for m68k making use of the new M68k
backend introduced with LLVM-13. Additional changes will be needed to be
able to actually use the backend for this target.
