Rollup merge of #123709 - tgross35:windows-cmd-docs-update, r=ChrisDenton

Update documentation related to the recent cmd.exe fix

Fix some grammar nits, change `bat` (extension) -> `batch` (file), and make line wrapping more consistent.
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Michael Goulet 2024-05-19 11:04:07 -04:00 committed by GitHub
commit 0f923a48c5
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2 changed files with 59 additions and 38 deletions

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@ -199,14 +199,14 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
/// Append literal text to the command line without any quoting or escaping.
///
/// This is useful for passing arguments to applications which doesn't follow
/// This is useful for passing arguments to applications that don't follow
/// the standard C run-time escaping rules, such as `cmd.exe /c`.
///
/// # Bat files
/// # Batch files
///
/// Note the `cmd /c` command line has slightly different escaping rules then bat files
/// Note the `cmd /c` command line has slightly different escaping rules than batch files
/// themselves. If possible, it may be better to write complex arguments to a temporary
/// .bat file, with appropriate escaping, and simply run that using:
/// `.bat` file, with appropriate escaping, and simply run that using:
///
/// ```no_run
/// # use std::process::Command;
@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
///
/// # Example
///
/// Run a bat script using both trusted and untrusted arguments.
/// Run a batch script using both trusted and untrusted arguments.
///
/// ```no_run
/// #[cfg(windows)]
@ -241,9 +241,10 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
/// if !user_name.chars().all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric()) {
/// return Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "invalid user name"));
/// }
/// // now we've checked the user name, let's add that too.
/// cmd_args.push(' ');
/// cmd_args.push_str(&format!("--user {user_name}"));
///
/// // now we have validated the user name, let's add that too.
/// cmd_args.push_str(" --user ");
/// cmd_args.push_str(user_name);
///
/// // call cmd.exe and return the output
/// Command::new("cmd.exe")
@ -287,25 +288,37 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
#[unstable(feature = "windows_process_extensions_async_pipes", issue = "98289")]
fn async_pipes(&mut self, always_async: bool) -> &mut process::Command;
/// Sets a raw attribute on the command, providing extended configuration options for Windows processes.
/// Set a raw attribute on the command, providing extended configuration options for Windows
/// processes.
///
/// This method allows you to specify custom attributes for a child process on Windows systems using raw attribute values.
/// Raw attributes provide extended configurability for process creation, but their usage can be complex and potentially unsafe.
/// This method allows you to specify custom attributes for a child process on Windows systems
/// using raw attribute values. Raw attributes provide extended configurability for process
/// creation, but their usage can be complex and potentially unsafe.
///
/// The `attribute` parameter specifies the raw attribute to be set, while the `value` parameter holds the value associated with that attribute.
/// Please refer to the [`windows-rs`](https://microsoft.github.io/windows-docs-rs/doc/windows/) documentation or the [`Win32 API documentation`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute) for detailed information about available attributes and their meanings.
/// The `attribute` parameter specifies the raw attribute to be set, while the `value`
/// parameter holds the value associated with that attribute. Please refer to the
/// [`windows-rs` documentation] or the [Win32 API documentation] for detailed information
/// about available attributes and their meanings.
///
/// [`windows-rs` documentation]: https://microsoft.github.io/windows-docs-rs/doc/windows/
/// [Win32 API documentation]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute
///
/// # Note
///
/// The maximum number of raw attributes is the value of [`u32::MAX`].
/// If this limit is exceeded, the call to [`process::Command::spawn`] will return an `Error` indicating that the maximum number of attributes has been exceeded.
/// If this limit is exceeded, the call to [`process::Command::spawn`] will return an `Error`
/// indicating that the maximum number of attributes has been exceeded.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// The usage of raw attributes is potentially unsafe and should be done with caution. Incorrect attribute values or improper configuration can lead to unexpected behavior or errors.
/// The usage of raw attributes is potentially unsafe and should be done with caution.
/// Incorrect attribute values or improper configuration can lead to unexpected behavior or
/// errors.
///
/// # Example
///
/// The following example demonstrates how to create a child process with a specific parent process ID using a raw attribute.
/// The following example demonstrates how to create a child process with a specific parent
/// process ID using a raw attribute.
///
/// ```rust
/// #![feature(windows_process_extensions_raw_attribute)]
@ -339,7 +352,9 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
///
/// # Safety Note
///
/// Remember that improper use of raw attributes can lead to undefined behavior or security vulnerabilities. Always consult the documentation and ensure proper attribute values are used.
/// Remember that improper use of raw attributes can lead to undefined behavior or security
/// vulnerabilities. Always consult the documentation and ensure proper attribute values are
/// used.
#[unstable(feature = "windows_process_extensions_raw_attribute", issue = "114854")]
unsafe fn raw_attribute<T: Copy + Send + Sync + 'static>(
&mut self,

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@ -90,8 +90,8 @@
//!
//! # Windows argument splitting
//!
//! On Unix systems arguments are passed to a new process as an array of strings
//! but on Windows arguments are passed as a single commandline string and it's
//! On Unix systems arguments are passed to a new process as an array of strings,
//! but on Windows arguments are passed as a single commandline string and it is
//! up to the child process to parse it into an array. Therefore the parent and
//! child processes must agree on how the commandline string is encoded.
//!
@ -107,26 +107,26 @@
//! * Use [`raw_arg`] to build a custom commandline. This bypasses the escaping
//! rules used by [`arg`] so should be used with due caution.
//!
//! `cmd.exe` and `.bat` use non-standard argument parsing and are especially
//! `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files use non-standard argument parsing and are especially
//! vulnerable to malicious input as they may be used to run arbitrary shell
//! commands. Untrusted arguments should be restricted as much as possible.
//! For examples on handling this see [`raw_arg`].
//!
//! ### Bat file special handling
//! ### Batch file special handling
//!
//! On Windows, `Command` uses the Windows API function [`CreateProcessW`] to
//! spawn new processes. An undocumented feature of this function is that,
//! spawn new processes. An undocumented feature of this function is that
//! when given a `.bat` file as the application to run, it will automatically
//! convert that into running `cmd.exe /c` with the bat file as the next argument.
//! convert that into running `cmd.exe /c` with the batch file as the next argument.
//!
//! For historical reasons Rust currently preserves this behaviour when using
//! [`Command::new`], and escapes the arguments according to `cmd.exe` rules.
//! Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe` argument handling, it might not be
//! possible to safely escape some special chars, and using them will result
//! possible to safely escape some special characters, and using them will result
//! in an error being returned at process spawn. The set of unescapeable
//! special chars might change between releases.
//! special characters might change between releases.
//!
//! Also note that running `.bat` scripts in this way may be removed in the
//! Also note that running batch scripts in this way may be removed in the
//! future and so should not be relied upon.
//!
//! [`spawn`]: Command::spawn
@ -659,16 +659,19 @@ impl Command {
///
/// Note that the argument is not passed through a shell, but given
/// literally to the program. This means that shell syntax like quotes,
/// escaped characters, word splitting, glob patterns, variable substitution, etc.
/// have no effect.
/// escaped characters, word splitting, glob patterns, variable substitution,
/// etc. have no effect.
///
/// <div class="warning">
///
/// On Windows use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
/// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to use with `arg`.
/// However some applications, such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files, use a non-standard way of decoding arguments
/// and are therefore vulnerable to malicious input.
/// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
/// On Windows, use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
/// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to
/// use with `arg`. However, some applications such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files
/// use a non-standard way of decoding arguments. They are therefore vulnerable
/// to malicious input.
///
/// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious
/// argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
///
/// See [Windows argument splitting][windows-args] for more details
/// or [`raw_arg`] for manually implementing non-standard argument encoding.
@ -710,11 +713,14 @@ impl Command {
///
/// <div class="warning">
///
/// On Windows use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
/// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to use with `args`.
/// However some applications, such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files, use a non-standard way of decoding arguments
/// and are therefore vulnerable to malicious input.
/// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
/// On Windows, use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
/// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to
/// use with `arg`. However, some applications such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files
/// use a non-standard way of decoding arguments. They are therefore vulnerable
/// to malicious input.
///
/// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious
/// argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
///
/// See [Windows argument splitting][windows-args] for more details
/// or [`raw_arg`] for manually implementing non-standard argument encoding.