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8e74e1fded
Rationale:
* The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance
with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack
successfully recovering the new LUKS key.
* However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when
they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new
challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge
the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key.
* Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the
same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device
compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret
has also been recovered by the attacker.
* Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce
the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which
would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful.
* Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered
once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous
system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot,
so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent
breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since
its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself).
Summary:
The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing
the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally
making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to
the Yubikey itself.
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| .. | ||
| loader | ||
| kernel.nix | ||
| kexec.nix | ||
| luksroot.nix | ||
| modprobe.nix | ||
| readonly-mountpoint.c | ||
| shutdown.nix | ||
| stage-1-init.sh | ||
| stage-1.nix | ||
| stage-2-init.sh | ||
| stage-2.nix | ||
| systemd-unit-options.nix | ||
| systemd.nix | ||