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nixpkgs/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pam_ssh_agent_auth/multiple-key-files.patch
Eelco Dolstra 3644f9124a pam_ssh_agent_auth: Allow multiple authorized keys files 
We need this because of https://github.com/NixOS/nixos/pull/52.
2012-12-17 21:11:10 +01:00

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diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2012-12-17 19:29:16.014226336 +0000
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@
return cookie;
}
-int
+const char *
pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
{
Identity *id;
Key *key;
AuthenticationConnection *ac;
char *comment;
- uint8_t retval = 0;
+ const char *key_file = 0;
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
session_id2 = pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen();
@@ -90,13 +90,11 @@
id->key = key;
id->filename = comment;
id->ac = ac;
- if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
- retval = 1;
- }
+ key_file = userauth_pubkey_from_id(id);
pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
- if(retval == 1)
+ if(key_file)
break;
}
}
@@ -107,5 +105,5 @@
}
pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2);
EVP_cleanup();
- return retval;
+ return key_file;
}
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h 2012-12-17 19:28:57.454334806 +0000
@@ -31,6 +31,6 @@
#ifndef _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
#define _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
-int pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
+const char * pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
#endif
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2012-12-17 19:30:24.013830673 +0000
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
#define strncasecmp_literal(A,B) strncasecmp( A, B, sizeof(B) - 1)
-char *authorized_keys_file = NULL;
uint8_t allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file = 0;
#if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
@@ -161,15 +160,13 @@
goto cleanexit;
}
- if(authorized_keys_file_input && user) {
- /*
- * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
- */
- parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
- } else {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
- }
+ if (!authorized_keys_file_input || !user)
+ authorized_keys_file_input = "/etc/security/authorized_keys";
+
+ /*
+ * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
+ */
+ parse_authorized_key_files(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
/*
* PAM_USER and PAM_RUSER do not necessarily have to get set by the calling application, and we may be unable to divine the latter.
@@ -177,16 +174,17 @@
*/
if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
/*
* this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
*/
- if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) {
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ const char *key_file;
+ if((key_file = pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid))) {
+ pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, key_file);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
} else {
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
}
} else {
pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@
free(__progname);
#endif
- free(authorized_keys_file);
+ free_authorized_key_files();
return retval;
}
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod 2012-12-17 19:52:35.968965448 +0000
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
=item file=<path to authorized_keys>
-Specify the path to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below)
+Specify the path(s) to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below). Paths are separated using colons.
=item allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2012-12-17 19:32:20.830157313 +0000
@@ -79,66 +79,96 @@
#include "identity.h"
#include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+#include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-extern char *authorized_keys_file;
+#define MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES 16
+
+char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES];
+unsigned int nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
extern uint8_t allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file;
uid_t authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid;
void
-parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
+parse_authorized_key_files(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
{
- char fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
+ const char *pos = authorized_keys_file_input;
char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
- char auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
- char *slash_ptr = NULL;
- char owner_uname[128] = "";
- size_t owner_uname_len = 0;
-
- /*
- * temporary copy, so that both tilde expansion and percent expansion both get to apply to the path
- */
- strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_input, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+ char fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
+
+#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
+ *hostname = '\0';
+ gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
+ strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
+#endif
- if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
- authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+ while (pos) {
+ const char *colon = strchr(pos, ':');
+ char auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
+ char *slash_ptr = NULL;
+ char owner_uname[128] = "";
+ size_t owner_uname_len = 0;
+
+ strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, pos, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+ if (colon) {
+ auth_keys_file_buf[colon - pos] = 0;
+ pos = colon + 1;
+ } else {
+ pos = 0;
+ }
- if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
- if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
+ if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+
+ if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
+ if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
+ authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+ }
+ else {
+ slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
+ if(!slash_ptr)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+
+ owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+ if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) )
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
+
+ strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+ if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+ authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+ }
+ char *tmp = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+ strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, tmp, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
+ pamsshagentauth_xfree(tmp);
}
- else {
- slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
- if(!slash_ptr)
- pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
-
- owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
- if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) )
- pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-
- strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
- if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
- authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+
+ if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
+ authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
}
- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
- strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
- }
- if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
- authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+ if (nr_authorized_keys_files >= MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("Too many authorized key files");
+ authorized_keys_files[nr_authorized_keys_files++] =
+ pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
}
+}
-#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
- *hostname = '\0';
- gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
- strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
-#endif
- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+void
+free_authorized_key_files()
+{
+ unsigned int n;
+ for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++)
+ free(authorized_keys_files[n]);
+ nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
}
-int
+const char *
pam_user_key_allowed(Key * key)
{
- return pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_file)
- || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file);
+ unsigned int n;
+ for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++) {
+ if (pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_files[n])
+ || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_files[n]))
+ return authorized_keys_files[n];
+ }
+ return 0;
}
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h 2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h 2012-12-17 19:24:34.477894517 +0000
@@ -28,11 +28,12 @@
*/
-#ifndef _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
-#define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+#ifndef _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
+#define _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
#include "identity.h"
-int pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
-void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+const char * pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
+void parse_authorized_key_files(const char *, const char *);
+void free_authorized_key_files();
#endif
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2012-12-17 19:27:30.813843933 +0000
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern uint8_t session_id_len;
-int
+const char *
userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
{
Buffer b = { 0 };
@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
u_int blen = 0, slen = 0;
int authenticated = 0;
+ const char *key_file;
pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
/* first test if this key is even allowed */
- if(! pam_user_key_allowed(id->key))
+ if(!(key_file = pam_user_key_allowed(id->key)))
goto user_auth_clean_exit;
if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
@@ -96,5 +97,5 @@
if(pkblob != NULL)
pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
- return authenticated;
+ return authenticated ? key_file : 0;
}
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h 2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h 2012-12-17 19:25:54.893412987 +0000
@@ -32,6 +32,6 @@
#define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
#include <identity.h>
-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
+const char * userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
#endif
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