These options are a good start for sandboxing the service. It's planned
to set `ProtectSystem` to `strict` instead of `full`, but that requires
specific directories to be configured as writable. It's also planned to
filter system calls. However, that requires more testing but it
shouldn't prevent us from applying these options for now and add others
later.
Signed-off-by: Felix Singer <felixsinger@posteo.net>
Some users would like to customize it.
Also, in current versions of fedimint p2p port in the URL
must be set, due to some bug, so update the example value
to reflect that.
- use upstream service and scripts
- switch to integrated-vtysh-config, abandon per-daemon config
- use always daemon names in options (e.g. ospf -> ospfd)
- zebra, mgmtd and staticd are always enabled
- abandon vtyListenAddress, vtyListenPort options; use
just "extraOptions" or "options" instead, respectively
- extend test to test staticd
- update release-notes
- pkgs.servers.frr: fix sbindir and remove FHS PATH
- introduce services.frr.openFilesLimit option
Currently if a timezone was selected explicitly, the service will
silently override the value, essentially ignoring what is meant to be a
a deliberate choice of option. This may cause confusion as to why the
option is not doing anything when this service is enabled, particularly
in more complex set-ups after some time.
This will simply make the choice deliberate from the user's part, either
by having to remove the option or lowering its priority as a recognition
that it may be ignored.
This change was inspired by the `services.tzupdate` module, which does
the same.
[1]: <https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/nixos/modules/services/misc/tzupdate.nix#L24>
Fixes CVE-2024-47176 and CVE-2024-47850. NixOS is not affected by these security issues by
default because we do not ship the default configuration file so it fallbacks to `BrowseRemoteProtocols dnssd`.
631/udp is removed from the open firewall ports, it was by the CUPS
browsing protocol.
Add postStart code that waits until Scrutiny has opened its port. This
fixes a race condition against scrutiny-collector, which can start (and
fail) before scrutiny is ready.
These options are a good start for sandboxing the service. It's planned
to set `ProtectSystem` to `strict` instead of `full`, but that requires
specific directories to be configured as writable. It's also planned to
filter system calls. However, that requires more testing but it
shouldn't prevent us from applying these options for now and add others
later.
In my tests, Redmine only bound to an IPv4 address and Unix socket,
which is why I restricted the address families to these both.
The command `systemd-analyze security redmine.service` reports an
overall exposure level of 2.9 with this patch.
Signed-off-by: Felix Singer <felixsinger@posteo.net>
