nixpkgs/pkgs/tools/misc/grub/2.0x.nix

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{ lib, stdenv, fetchgit, flex, bison, python3, autoconf, automake, gnulib, libtool
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, gettext, ncurses, libusb-compat-0_1, freetype, qemu, lvm2, unifont, pkg-config
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, buildPackages
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, nixosTests
, fuse # only needed for grub-mount
, runtimeShell
, zfs ? null
, efiSupport ? false
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, zfsSupport ? false
, xenSupport ? false
, kbdcompSupport ? false, ckbcomp
}:
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with lib;
let
pcSystems = {
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i686-linux.target = "i386";
x86_64-linux.target = "i386";
};
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efiSystemsBuild = {
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i686-linux.target = "i386";
x86_64-linux.target = "x86_64";
aarch64-linux.target = "aarch64";
};
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# For aarch64, we need to use '--target=aarch64-efi' when building,
# but '--target=arm64-efi' when installing. Insanity!
efiSystemsInstall = {
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i686-linux.target = "i386";
x86_64-linux.target = "x86_64";
aarch64-linux.target = "arm64";
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};
canEfi = any (system: stdenv.hostPlatform.system == system) (mapAttrsToList (name: _: name) efiSystemsBuild);
inPCSystems = any (system: stdenv.hostPlatform.system == system) (mapAttrsToList (name: _: name) pcSystems);
grub: 2.0.4 -> 2.0.6-rc1 Quoting from https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html: ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
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version = "2.06-rc1";
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in (
assert efiSupport -> canEfi;
assert zfsSupport -> zfs != null;
assert !(efiSupport && xenSupport);
stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
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pname = "grub";
inherit version;
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src = fetchgit {
url = "git://git.savannah.gnu.org/grub.git";
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rev = "${pname}-${version}";
grub: 2.0.4 -> 2.0.6-rc1 Quoting from https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html: ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
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sha256 = "1ngc960g4w91rg13l724v6nlj6fq1adxp6is2mrq4bnp7sm9mysa";
};
patches = [
./fix-bash-completion.patch
];
postPatch = if kbdcompSupport then ''
sed -i util/grub-kbdcomp.in -e 's@\bckbcomp\b@${ckbcomp}/bin/ckbcomp@'
'' else ''
echo '#! ${runtimeShell}' > util/grub-kbdcomp.in
echo 'echo "Compile grub2 with { kbdcompSupport = true; } to enable support for this command."' >> util/grub-kbdcomp.in
'';
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depsBuildBuild = [ buildPackages.stdenv.cc ];
nativeBuildInputs = [ bison flex python3 pkg-config autoconf automake gettext freetype ];
buildInputs = [ ncurses libusb-compat-0_1 freetype lvm2 fuse libtool ]
++ optional doCheck qemu
++ optional zfsSupport zfs;
strictDeps = true;
hardeningDisable = [ "all" ];
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grub2: Workaround flex bug I think the flex update in 6bded45883eb7f6ead12494917e1ecd92c3b4458 causes this failure, presumably due to upstream breakage: ```` gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -Wall -W -DGRUB_UTIL=1 -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -I./include -DGRUB_FILE=\"grub_script.yy.c\" -I. -I. -I. -I. -I./include -I./include -I./grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/src/ -I./grub-core/lib/minilzo -I./grub-core/lib/xzembed -DMINILZO_HAVE_CONFIG_H -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -Wall -W -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wundef -Wchar-subscripts -Wcomment -Wdeprecated-declarations -Wdisabled-optimization -Wdiv-by-zero -Wfloat-equal -Wformat-extra-args -Wformat-security -Wformat-y2k -Wimplicit -Wimplicit-function-declaration -Wimplicit-int -Wmain -Wmissing-braces -Wmissing-format-attribute -Wmultichar -Wparentheses -Wreturn-type -Wsequence-point -Wshadow -Wsign-compare -Wswitch -Wtrigraphs -Wunknown-pragmas -Wunused -Wunused-function -Wunused-label -Wunused-parameter -Wunused-value -Wunused-variable -Wwrite-strings -Wnested-externs -Wstrict-prototypes -Wcast-align -Wextra -Wattributes -Wendif-labels -Winit-self -Wint-to-pointer-cast -Winvalid-pch -Wmissing-field-initializers -Wnonnull -Woverflow -Wvla -Wpointer-to-int-cast -Wstrict-aliasing -Wvariadic-macros -Wvolatile-register-var -Wpointer-sign -Wmissing-include-dirs -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wformat=2 -Werror -fno-builtin -Wno-undef -c -o libgrubmods_a-grub_script.yy.o `test -f 'grub_script.yy.c' || echo './'`grub_script.yy.c ./grub-core/script/yylex.l:34:0: error: "yyalloc" redefined [-Werror] #define yyalloc(size, scanner) (grub_malloc((size))) ^ grub_script.yy.c:104:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition ^ ./grub-core/script/yylex.l:35:0: error: "yyfree" redefined [-Werror] #define yyfree(ptr, scanner) (grub_free((ptr))) ^ grub_script.yy.c:108:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition ^ ./grub-core/script/yylex.l:36:0: error: "yyrealloc" redefined [-Werror] #define yyrealloc(ptr, size, scanner) (grub_realloc((ptr), (size))) ^ grub_script.yy.c:106:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition ^ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors make[2]: *** [Makefile:7540: libgrubmods_a-grub_script.yy.o] Error 1 ```` Work around it for now.
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# Work around a bug in the generated flex lexer (upstream flex bug?)
NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE = "-Wno-error";
preConfigure =
'' for i in "tests/util/"*.in
do
sed -i "$i" -e's|/bin/bash|${stdenv.shell}|g'
done
# Apparently, the QEMU executable is no longer called
# `qemu-system-i386', even on i386.
#
# In addition, use `-nodefaults' to avoid errors like:
#
# chardev: opening backend "stdio" failed
# qemu: could not open serial device 'stdio': Invalid argument
#
# See <http://www.mail-archive.com/qemu-devel@nongnu.org/msg22775.html>.
sed -i "tests/util/grub-shell.in" \
-e's/qemu-system-i386/qemu-system-x86_64 -nodefaults/g'
unset CPP # setting CPP intereferes with dependency calculation
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patchShebangs .
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./bootstrap --no-git --gnulib-srcdir=${gnulib}
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substituteInPlace ./configure --replace '/usr/share/fonts/unifont' '${unifont}/share/fonts'
'';
configureFlags = [
"--enable-grub-mount" # dep of os-prober
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] ++ optionals (stdenv.hostPlatform != stdenv.buildPlatform) [
# grub doesn't do cross-compilation as usual and tries to use unprefixed
# tools to target the host. Provide toolchain information explicitly for
# cross builds.
#
# Ref: # https://github.com/buildroot/buildroot/blob/master/boot/grub2/grub2.mk#L108
"TARGET_CC=${stdenv.cc.targetPrefix}cc"
"TARGET_NM=${stdenv.cc.targetPrefix}nm"
"TARGET_OBJCOPY=${stdenv.cc.targetPrefix}objcopy"
"TARGET_RANLIB=${stdenv.cc.targetPrefix}ranlib"
"TARGET_STRIP=${stdenv.cc.targetPrefix}strip"
] ++ optional zfsSupport "--enable-libzfs"
++ optionals efiSupport [ "--with-platform=efi" "--target=${efiSystemsBuild.${stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.target}" "--program-prefix=" ]
++ optionals xenSupport [ "--with-platform=xen" "--target=${efiSystemsBuild.${stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.target}"];
# save target that grub is compiled for
grubTarget = if efiSupport
then "${efiSystemsInstall.${stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.target}-efi"
else if inPCSystems
then "${pcSystems.${stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.target}-pc"
else "";
doCheck = false;
enableParallelBuilding = true;
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postInstall = ''
# Avoid a runtime reference to gcc
sed -i $out/lib/grub/*/modinfo.sh -e "/grub_target_cppflags=/ s|'.*'|' '|"
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'';
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passthru.tests = {
nixos-grub = nixosTests.grub;
nixos-install-simple = nixosTests.installer.simple;
nixos-install-grub1 = nixosTests.installer.grub1;
nixos-install-grub-uefi = nixosTests.installer.simpleUefiGrub;
nixos-install-grub-uefi-spec = nixosTests.installer.simpleUefiGrubSpecialisation;
};
meta = with lib; {
description = "GNU GRUB, the Grand Unified Boot Loader (2.x beta)";
longDescription =
'' GNU GRUB is a Multiboot boot loader. It was derived from GRUB, GRand
Unified Bootloader, which was originally designed and implemented by
Erich Stefan Boleyn.
Briefly, the boot loader is the first software program that runs when a
computer starts. It is responsible for loading and transferring
control to the operating system kernel software (such as the Hurd or
the Linux). The kernel, in turn, initializes the rest of the
operating system (e.g., GNU).
'';
homepage = "https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/";
license = licenses.gpl3Plus;
platforms = platforms.gnu ++ platforms.linux;
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maintainers = [ maintainers.samueldr ];
};
})