nixpkgs/pkgs/build-support/build-fhsenv-bubblewrap/default.nix

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{ lib
, stdenv
, callPackage
, runCommandLocal
, writeShellScript
, glibc
, pkgsi686Linux
, coreutils
, bubblewrap
}:
{ name ? null
, pname ? null
, version ? null
, runScript ? "bash"
, extraInstallCommands ? ""
, meta ? {}
, passthru ? {}
, extraPreBwrapCmds ? ""
, extraBwrapArgs ? []
buildFHSEnv: disable security features by default The implicit contract of buildFHSUserEnv was that it allows to run software built for a typical GNU/Linux distribution (not NixOS) without patching it (patchelf, autoPatchelfHook, etc.). Note that this does not inherently imply running untrusted programs. buildFHSUserEnv was implemented by using chroot and assembling a standard-compliant FHS environment in the new root. As expected, this did not provide any kind of isolation between the system and the programs. However, when it was later reimplemented using bubblewrap (PR #225748), which *is* a security tool, several isolation features involving detaches Linux namespaces were turned on by default. This decision has introduced a number of breakages that are very difficult to debug and trace back to this change. For example: `unshareIPC` breaks software audio mixing in programs using ALSA (dmix) and `unsharePID` breaks gdb, Since: 1. the security features were enable without any clear threat model; 2. `buildFHSEnvBubblewrap` is supposed to be a drop-in replacement of `buildFHSEnvChrootenv` (see the release notes for NixOS 23.05); 3. the change is breaking in several common cases (security does not come for free); 4. the contract was not changed, or at least communicated in a clear way to the users; all security features should be turned off by default. P.S. It would be useful to create a variant of buildFHSEnv that does provide some isolation. This could unshare some namespaces and mount only limited parts of the filesystem. Note that buildFHSEnv mounts every directory in / under the new root, so again, very little is gained by unsharing alone.
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, unshareUser ? false
, unshareIpc ? false
, unsharePid ? false
, unshareNet ? false
buildFHSEnv: disable security features by default The implicit contract of buildFHSUserEnv was that it allows to run software built for a typical GNU/Linux distribution (not NixOS) without patching it (patchelf, autoPatchelfHook, etc.). Note that this does not inherently imply running untrusted programs. buildFHSUserEnv was implemented by using chroot and assembling a standard-compliant FHS environment in the new root. As expected, this did not provide any kind of isolation between the system and the programs. However, when it was later reimplemented using bubblewrap (PR #225748), which *is* a security tool, several isolation features involving detaches Linux namespaces were turned on by default. This decision has introduced a number of breakages that are very difficult to debug and trace back to this change. For example: `unshareIPC` breaks software audio mixing in programs using ALSA (dmix) and `unsharePID` breaks gdb, Since: 1. the security features were enable without any clear threat model; 2. `buildFHSEnvBubblewrap` is supposed to be a drop-in replacement of `buildFHSEnvChrootenv` (see the release notes for NixOS 23.05); 3. the change is breaking in several common cases (security does not come for free); 4. the contract was not changed, or at least communicated in a clear way to the users; all security features should be turned off by default. P.S. It would be useful to create a variant of buildFHSEnv that does provide some isolation. This could unshare some namespaces and mount only limited parts of the filesystem. Note that buildFHSEnv mounts every directory in / under the new root, so again, very little is gained by unsharing alone.
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, unshareUts ? false
, unshareCgroup ? false
, privateTmp ? false
, dieWithParent ? true
, ...
} @ args:
assert (pname != null || version != null) -> (name == null && pname != null); # You must declare either a name or pname + version (preferred).
let
inherit (lib)
concatLines
concatStringsSep
escapeShellArgs
filter
optionalString
splitString
;
inherit (lib.attrsets) removeAttrs;
pname = if args ? name && args.name != null then args.name else args.pname;
versionStr = optionalString (version != null) ("-" + version);
name = pname + versionStr;
buildFHSEnv = callPackage ./buildFHSEnv.nix { };
fhsenv = buildFHSEnv (removeAttrs (args // { inherit name; }) [
"runScript" "extraInstallCommands" "meta" "passthru" "extraPreBwrapCmds" "extraBwrapArgs" "dieWithParent"
"unshareUser" "unshareCgroup" "unshareUts" "unshareNet" "unsharePid" "unshareIpc" "privateTmp"
"pname" "version"
]);
etcBindEntries = let
files = [
# NixOS Compatibility
"static"
"nix" # mainly for nixUnstable users, but also for access to nix/netrc
# Shells
"shells"
"bashrc"
"zshenv"
"zshrc"
"zinputrc"
"zprofile"
# Users, Groups, NSS
"passwd"
"group"
"shadow"
"hosts"
"resolv.conf"
"nsswitch.conf"
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# User profiles
"profiles"
# Sudo & Su
"login.defs"
"sudoers"
"sudoers.d"
# Time
"localtime"
"zoneinfo"
# Other Core Stuff
"machine-id"
"os-release"
# PAM
"pam.d"
# Fonts
"fonts"
# ALSA
"alsa"
"asound.conf"
# SSL
"ssl/certs"
"ca-certificates"
"pki"
];
in map (path: "/etc/${path}") files;
# Create this on the fly instead of linking from /nix
# The container might have to modify it and re-run ldconfig if there are
# issues running some binary with LD_LIBRARY_PATH
createLdConfCache = ''
cat > /etc/ld.so.conf <<EOF
/lib
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu
/lib64
/usr/lib
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu
/usr/lib64
/lib/i386-linux-gnu
/lib32
/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu
/usr/lib32
/run/opengl-driver/lib
/run/opengl-driver-32/lib
EOF
ldconfig &> /dev/null
'';
init = run: writeShellScript "${name}-init" ''
source /etc/profile
${createLdConfCache}
exec ${run} "$@"
'';
indentLines = str: concatLines (map (s: " " + s) (filter (s: s != "") (splitString "\n" str)));
bwrapCmd = { initArgs ? "" }: ''
${extraPreBwrapCmds}
ignored=(/nix /dev /proc /etc ${optionalString privateTmp "/tmp"})
ro_mounts=()
symlinks=()
etc_ignored=()
for i in ${fhsenv}/*; do
path="/''${i##*/}"
if [[ $path == '/etc' ]]; then
:
elif [[ -L $i ]]; then
symlinks+=(--symlink "$(${coreutils}/bin/readlink "$i")" "$path")
ignored+=("$path")
else
ro_mounts+=(--ro-bind "$i" "$path")
ignored+=("$path")
fi
done
if [[ -d ${fhsenv}/etc ]]; then
for i in ${fhsenv}/etc/*; do
path="/''${i##*/}"
# NOTE: we're binding /etc/fonts and /etc/ssl/certs from the host so we
# don't want to override it with a path from the FHS environment.
if [[ $path == '/fonts' || $path == '/ssl' ]]; then
continue
fi
ro_mounts+=(--ro-bind "$i" "/etc$path")
etc_ignored+=("/etc$path")
done
fi
# propagate /etc from the actual host if nested
if [[ -e /.host-etc ]]; then
ro_mounts+=(--ro-bind /.host-etc /.host-etc)
else
ro_mounts+=(--ro-bind /etc /.host-etc)
fi
for i in ${escapeShellArgs etcBindEntries}; do
if [[ "''${etc_ignored[@]}" =~ "$i" ]]; then
continue
fi
if [[ -e $i ]]; then
symlinks+=(--symlink "/.host-etc/''${i#/etc/}" "$i")
fi
done
declare -a auto_mounts
# loop through all directories in the root
for dir in /*; do
# if it is a directory and it is not ignored
if [[ -d "$dir" ]] && [[ ! "''${ignored[@]}" =~ "$dir" ]]; then
# add it to the mount list
auto_mounts+=(--bind "$dir" "$dir")
fi
done
declare -a x11_args
# Always mount a tmpfs on /tmp/.X11-unix
# Rationale: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/blob/be2de97e862e5ca223da40a895e54e7bf24dbfb9/common/flatpak-run.c#L277
x11_args+=(--tmpfs /tmp/.X11-unix)
# Try to guess X socket path. This doesn't cover _everything_, but it covers some things.
if [[ "$DISPLAY" == :* ]]; then
display_nr=''${DISPLAY#?}
local_socket=/tmp/.X11-unix/X$display_nr
x11_args+=(--ro-bind-try "$local_socket" "$local_socket")
fi
${optionalString privateTmp ''
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# sddm places XAUTHORITY in /tmp
if [[ "$XAUTHORITY" == /tmp/* ]]; then
x11_args+=(--ro-bind-try "$XAUTHORITY" "$XAUTHORITY")
fi
# dbus-run-session puts the socket in /tmp
IFS=";" read -ra addrs <<<"$DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"
for addr in "''${addrs[@]}"; do
[[ "$addr" == unix:* ]] || continue
IFS="," read -ra parts <<<"''${addr#unix:}"
for part in "''${parts[@]}"; do
printf -v part '%s' "''${part//\\/\\\\}"
printf -v part '%b' "''${part//%/\\x}"
[[ "$part" == path=/tmp/* ]] || continue
x11_args+=(--ro-bind-try "''${part#path=}" "''${part#path=}")
done
done
''}
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cmd=(
${bubblewrap}/bin/bwrap
--dev-bind /dev /dev
--proc /proc
--chdir "$(pwd)"
${optionalString unshareUser "--unshare-user"}
${optionalString unshareIpc "--unshare-ipc"}
${optionalString unsharePid "--unshare-pid"}
${optionalString unshareNet "--unshare-net"}
${optionalString unshareUts "--unshare-uts"}
${optionalString unshareCgroup "--unshare-cgroup"}
${optionalString dieWithParent "--die-with-parent"}
--ro-bind /nix /nix
${optionalString privateTmp "--tmpfs /tmp"}
# Our glibc will look for the cache in its own path in `/nix/store`.
# As such, we need a cache to exist there, because pressure-vessel
# depends on the existence of an ld cache. However, adding one
# globally proved to be a bad idea (see #100655), the solution we
# settled on being mounting one via bwrap.
# Also, the cache needs to go to both 32 and 64 bit glibcs, for games
# of both architectures to work.
--tmpfs ${glibc}/etc \
--tmpfs /etc \
--symlink /etc/ld.so.conf ${glibc}/etc/ld.so.conf \
--symlink /etc/ld.so.cache ${glibc}/etc/ld.so.cache \
--ro-bind ${glibc}/etc/rpc ${glibc}/etc/rpc \
--remount-ro ${glibc}/etc \
'' + optionalString (stdenv.isx86_64 && stdenv.isLinux) (indentLines ''
--tmpfs ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc \
--symlink /etc/ld.so.conf ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc/ld.so.conf \
--symlink /etc/ld.so.cache ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc/ld.so.cache \
--ro-bind ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc/rpc ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc/rpc \
--remount-ro ${pkgsi686Linux.glibc}/etc \
'') + ''
"''${ro_mounts[@]}"
"''${symlinks[@]}"
"''${auto_mounts[@]}"
"''${x11_args[@]}"
${concatStringsSep "\n " extraBwrapArgs}
${init runScript} ${initArgs}
)
exec "''${cmd[@]}"
'';
bin = writeShellScript "${name}-bwrap" (bwrapCmd { initArgs = ''"$@"''; });
in runCommandLocal name {
inherit pname version;
inherit meta;
passthru = passthru // {
env = runCommandLocal "${name}-shell-env" {
shellHook = bwrapCmd {};
} ''
echo >&2 ""
echo >&2 "*** User chroot 'env' attributes are intended for interactive nix-shell sessions, not for building! ***"
echo >&2 ""
exit 1
'';
inherit args fhsenv;
};
} ''
mkdir -p $out/bin
ln -s ${bin} $out/bin/${pname}
${extraInstallCommands}
''